Reasonable articulable suspicion = what exactly was he doing that was suspicious.
Excuse me officer in what manner am I suspicious?
Existing
Reasonable articulable suspicion = what exactly was he doing that was suspicious.
Excuse me officer in what manner am I suspicious?
If you added it on to a couple of other posts informing him that it was old news, I can understand his reaction.I did not get a snarky tone from your post
Try to stay with me.
Guy
Lighten up, Francis. Its just some friendly ribbing.My bad. Last time I link one of my articles to INGO. You folks obviously have it all covered.
If the officers had kept to a consensual encounter and foregone the orders Terry never would have been implicated and there wouldn't be a successful appeal.If you take the gun out of the equation, I wonder if the court would have found the stop and question consistent with Terry? Based on the comments regarding the response of the officers it seems a bit inconsistent
Good ruling!
Good Intel!
Now. How do we ensure this information - couched exactly as Guy wrote it up - is in the hands of the summer study committee for CC in Indiana?
If the officers had kept to a consensual encounter and foregone the orders Terry never would have been implicated and there wouldn't be a successful appeal.
So nobody has even alluded to, much less answered, the important question: Why is Guy Relford's article illustrated with a picture of a Makarov?
My question is, does this in any way affect the "I need to check the serial number on your gun" officer?
Or the one that feels it necessary to "hold on to that for office safey"?
Such as the one Mark1911 ran into in the great anti-gun city of Hammond.
An officer may conduct a limited search for weapons only when he has areasonable belief that the suspect is armed and dangerous.
I think the current state of the "officer safety" doctrine is parallel to RAS. The officer must have a reasonable articulable reason why he or she was concerned about officer safety.
See:
http://www.ai.org/judiciary/opinions/pdf/07310704pds.pdf
The presumptive lawfulness of an individual’s gun possession in a particular State does next to nothing to negate the reasonable concern an officer has for his own safety when forcing an encounter with an individual who is armed with a gun and whose propensities are unknown...
If the majority opinion were not bad enough, Judge James A. Wynn wrote an incendiary concurrence berating the majority for focusing broadly on “weapons” rather than on firearms specifically. Wynn’s opinion argued that the majority’s reasoning also necessitated recognition of two other “key issues.” The first, Wynn wrote, is that “individuals who carry firearms -- lawfully or unlawfully -- pose a categorical risk of danger to others and police officers, in particular.” The second is that “individuals who choose to carry firearms [therefore] forego certain constitutional protections afforded to individuals who elect not to carry firearms.”
Judge Wynn went on to explain how he believes the law of the Fourth Circuit – which includes Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia – is now that lawful gun owners are second class citizens.
“[T]he majority decision today necessarily leads to the conclusion that individuals who elect to carry firearms forego other constitutional rights,” Wynn wrote, “like the Fourth Amendment right to have law enforcement officers ‘knock-and-announce’ before forcibly entering homes.” He continued, “Likewise, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that individuals who choose to carry firearms necessarily face greater restriction on their concurrent exercise of other constitutional rights, like those protected by the First Amendment.”