GuyRelford
Master
You guys are good. Here is my answer (which of course is just my opinion):
The purpose of my scenario was to demonstrate the very fine line between the Gaddis case (which holds that the mere display of a handgun is not a"threat" under the intimidation statute) and the Johnson case (which holds that the display of a handgun, together with "what can only be construed as 'fighting words'") does constitute a threat and supports a conviction for intimidation.
My scenario was intended to be a very close call, and I think your responses reflect that very well. And Fargo (Joe) raised a very important issue that I didn't even intend to be a factor - whether the "boyfriend" was threatening to commit an illegal act by keeping your daughter out past curfew, such that the intimidation statute wouldn't even apply - since one of the provisions of the intimidation statute references "retaliation for a prior lawful act." I think that's a brilliant point. However, I don’t think it applies here, for reasons stated below:
The crime of intimidation occurs when the threat is made – not prospectively. Here, “you” are attempting to influence the boyfriend’s behavior – so the first provision of the statute applies:
The purpose of my scenario was to demonstrate the very fine line between the Gaddis case (which holds that the mere display of a handgun is not a"threat" under the intimidation statute) and the Johnson case (which holds that the display of a handgun, together with "what can only be construed as 'fighting words'") does constitute a threat and supports a conviction for intimidation.
My scenario was intended to be a very close call, and I think your responses reflect that very well. And Fargo (Joe) raised a very important issue that I didn't even intend to be a factor - whether the "boyfriend" was threatening to commit an illegal act by keeping your daughter out past curfew, such that the intimidation statute wouldn't even apply - since one of the provisions of the intimidation statute references "retaliation for a prior lawful act." I think that's a brilliant point. However, I don’t think it applies here, for reasons stated below:
The crime of intimidation occurs when the threat is made – not prospectively. Here, “you” are attempting to influence the boyfriend’s behavior – so the first provision of the statute applies:
“Intimidation is defined by Indiana Code section 35-45-2-1,
which states in relevant part:
(a) A person who communicates a threat toanother person, with
the intent that:
(1) the other person engage in conduct against his will; or
(2) the other person be placed in fear of retaliation for a prior lawful act;
commits intimidation, a Class A misdemeanor."
So, if no such “prior lawful [or unlawful] act” has yet occurred, we’re not talking about retaliation at all – we’re talking about causing the boyfriend to “engage in conduct against his will.” Clearly, “you” are trying to influence the boyfriend’s behavior. So the issue comes down to whether you have made a "threat."
Under this scenario – a jury would have to make that decision, if the cops decided to arrest you and the prosecutor decided to proceed to trial – and I think that’s a very close call.
At trial, the boyfriend would take the stand, and be asked by the prosecutor what he believed you meant when you raised your shirt and said, “midnight.” He would likely say something to the effect of “I believed with all my heart that he was saying that if I didn’t bring his daughter home by midnight he would kill me.” That alone would distinguish this case from the Gaddis case, because the court in Gaddis focused specifically on the fact that the defendant and the “victim” never actually communicated. They were on the highway in a “road rage” situation, but they both testified that they couldn’t hear each other – or even see other’s hand gestures clearly. So in that case – there was only the display of a handgun, with no verbal communication.
So is our case closer to Johnson, in which the defendant raises his shirt to display a handgun and said “don’t even think it,” after an earlier “f--- you”? (Those were the “fighting words” that the court relied upon to support the conviction for intimidation.) Or is it closer to Gaddis – in which there was only the display of a handgun, with no verbal communication?
In other words, is simply saying “midnight”(while you’re displaying your Kimber) more like saying nothing at all, like in Gaddis – or more like saying “don’t even think it” (after an earlier “f---- you”) – like in Johnson?
That is what a jury would have to decide – in all likelihood – because a jury decides issues of fact (i.e., did you communicate a “threat” to the boyfriend?). That is going to depend a lot on the quality of your lawyer and who is sitting on the jury. If the jury specifically decided that your display of a gun, while saying “midnight,” was a threat, intended to cause the boyfriend to “engage in conduct against his will,” I think that conviction would likely hold up on appeal. Of course, the jury could just as easily decide that you weren’t threatening anyone, in which case everyone goes home to their own bed at night.
But the point of my scenario was to demonstrate that influencing someone else’s behavior is best accomplished without the threat of violence with a firearm – explicit or implicit – based on Indiana’s intimidation statute and the cases construing it.
Just my thoughts.
Guy
Last edited: