Cops don't know IC, why would we expect them to know case law? They don't and I don't expect them to. Its YOUR job to know your rights, the law, case law AND how it applies.
I do.
Cops don't know IC, why would we expect them to know case law? They don't and I don't expect them to. Its YOUR job to know your rights, the law, case law AND how it applies.
Police can really ask you anything they want to during a stop so long as it doesn't prolong the detention. Kirk is right though, you are under no obligation to answer although people usually do. The exception is when a traffic stop is made under the seatbelt enforcement act to determine compliance. In that case you can't ask anything of an investigatory nature. That is really what Richardson is about..IMO...although I do not sit on the Indiana Supremem Court.
I do.
I re-read Richardson just for you, Frost, and I just can't see any other interpretation. Maybe you can enlighten me.
The fact remains that Richardson's production of a valid gun permit should have resulted in the termination of any further questioning
That's true, but questioning during detention is a constitutional issue; the ruling in this case was decided on statutory grounds meaning that the wording of the Indiana Seatbelt Statute prohibited the questioning in this case, not that this type of questioning would be prohibited under different circumstances such as stopped for speedingThe fact remains that Richardson's production of a valid gun permit should have resulted in the termination of any further questioning
That's true, but questioning during detention is a constitutional issue; the ruling in this case was decided on statutory grounds meaning that the wording of the Indiana Seatbelt Statute prohibited the questioning in this case, not that this type of questioning would be prohibited under different circumstances such as stopped for speeding
should have read something like this:The fact remains that Richardson's production of a valid gun permit should have resulted in the termination of any further questioning
The fact remains that Richardson's stop for a seatbelt violation should have resulted in the termination of any further questioning
Maybe I don't understand exactly what your position is because I agree with all of that. The stop was legal, the questioning was bad..because of the wording of the seatbelt enforcement act..and the trial was bad. I believe the same questioning under different circumstances would be permissible. Is your position otherwise?Yes, and what I quoted was from the addendum to the ruling. The stop was good (seatbelt), how it was conducted was bad (questioning and detention), and the first trial was bad. Those are three different parts that require the appeals court to send out a multi point ruling plus whatever else they want to clarify while they are at it.
Somebody rep Titanium_Frost for me; I'm out.
Maybe I don't understand exactly what your position is because I agree with all of that. The stop was legal, the questioning was bad..because of the wording of the seatbelt enforcement act..and the trial was bad. I believe the same questioning under different circumstances would be permissible. Is your position otherwise?
cautioning that a traffic stop based solely upon the failure of the driver or the passenger to wear a seat belt does not provide reasonable suspicion for the officer to “unilaterally expand [an] investigation and „fish‟ for evidence of other possible crimes.
Did Officer Eastwood‟s inquiry, during a traffic stop for a seat belt violation, regarding a “large, unusual bulge” in the defendant‟s pocket, cross the line? The State relies on our decision in State v. Washington, 898 N.E.2d 1200, 1207-08 (Ind. 2008), to contend that Officer Eastwood‟s inquiry was entirely proper because under Section 11, an officer may ask a motorist whether he or she has weapon on his person.
While Officer Eastwood did observe an “unusual bulge,” this fact standing alone did not provide the independent basis of reasonable suspicion that Baldwin requires, especially in light of Richardson‟s immediate compliance and Officer Eastwood‟s prior peaceful exchanges with Richardson.
There will, of course, be circumstances where something more than an “unusual bulge” will be visible, or other conditions that provide a police officer with the requisite reasonable suspicion to conduct further inquiry. This is not one of them. And even if the facts were such that Officer Eastwood‟s questioning about the bulge was proper, the fact remains that Richardson‟s 7production of a valid gun permit should have resulted in the termination of any further questioning
All of that precedes your quote. I think it clearly states it was because of the statutory wording. Richardson is not about seatbelt infractions it is about limiting police authority under the Seatbelt Enforcement Act to stop motorists without probable cause to determine compliance. It does this by only allowing officers to handle the seatbelt matter and not investigate anything further without RS.
On these facts, we agree with the trial court that Officer Eastwood‟s questioning about the "unusual bulge" contravened the Act.
There will, of course, be circumstances where something more than an "unusual bulge" will be visible, or other conditions that provide a police officer with the requisite reasonable suspicion to conduct further inquiry.
All of that precedes your quote. I think it clearly states it was because of the statutory wording. Richardson is not about seatbelt infractions it is about limiting police authority under the Seatbelt Enforcement Act to stop motorists without probable cause to determine compliance. It does this by only allowing officers to handle the seatbelt matter and not investigate anything further without RS.
All of that precedes your quote. I think it clearly states it was because of the statutory wording. Richardson is not about seatbelt infractions it is about limiting police authority under the Seatbelt Enforcement Act to stop motorists without probable cause to determine compliance. It does this by only allowing officers to handle the seatbelt matter and not investigate anything further without RS.
No, I agree with that completely. What I am saying is that in this case no further questioning is permitted because of the Act. For example I could not ask for consent to search the car. In other circumstances, I could still ask other questions so long as it didn't unreasonably lengthen the stop..such as permission to search. With the Act, RS is needed to ask anything else, not so with other infractions so long as I don't lengthen the stop.But with their ruling, they in essence stated that once a valid LTCH is produced, there is no longer any case for "reasonable suspicion". Does this definition of RS only pertain to seatbelt violations?
No, I agree with that completely. What I am saying is that in this case no further questioning is permitted because of the Act. For example I could not ask for consent to search the car. In other circumstances, I could still ask other questions so long as it didn't unreasonably lengthen the stop..such as permission to search. With the Act, RS is needed to ask anything else, not so with other infractions so long as I don't lengthen the stop.
"the statute requires that when a stop to determine seat belt law compliance is made, the police are strictly prohibited from determining anything else, even if other law would permit."