irs getting shotguns

[WHAT HAPPENED]

Unconstitutional laws should NOT be enforced! *cough*FederalIncomeTax*cough*

WHERE WERE YOU ON THE OPTING OUT OF SS THREAD

 

[JetGirl]

WHERE WERE YOU ON THE OPTING OUT OF SS THREAD

My bad

 

[birdhunter55]

Everyone on this post that hasn't already needs to read Unintended Consequences by John Ross. It is fiction, but it does make you think. And it is pertinent to what is being discussed here

 

[groovatron]

Unconstitutional laws should NOT be enforced! *cough*FederalIncomeTax*cough*

Yes ma'am!!!!!

 

[ocsdor]

[ame=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R7mRSI8yWwg]YouTube - Paying income tax in America is Voluntary[/ame]

 

[Fletch]

And all of this is a perfect example of why I find the Constitution an inadequate protector of individual rights and an insufficient restraint on Leviathan. Law is no substitute for morality. It's disheartening, the number of people here who apparently believe otherwise.

 

[Garb]

To a degree I agree with you. But I also feel that the only time that lethal force is justified by a governmental agency is in direct defense of agent's lives, not to enforce laws. Waiting someone out may take time and resources but it's better than killing them because they didn't pay their taxes.

Yes, waiting them out would be a great idea, except it would consume too much time and manpower. What if the guy is in a house on a hill with three years worth of food? Should a SWAT team really get paid to sit at the bottom of a hill for three years, just out of range of a long range sniper rifle? I hate to say it, but violence is the most cost effective, and realistic way to go in this situation.

 

[Fletch]

Because above all, government should be efficient, right?

 

[ocsdor]

Yes, waiting them out would be a great idea, except it would consume too much time and manpower. What if the guy is in a house on a hill with three years worth of food? Should a SWAT team really get paid to sit at the bottom of a hill for three years, just out of range of a long range sniper rifle? I hate to say it, but violence is the most cost effective, and realistic way to go in this situation.

Or, you could just put out a warrant for their arrest and wait. Either they will leave their compound and be captured or they will imprison themselves on their land forever.

You could also put out a bounty for their arrest and let the bounty hunters do the work. That would be a lot cheaper and, likely, less bloody.

 

[dross]

Armored vehicles, fires, FBI snipers, shooting pet dogs and taunting a house with children while their mother lies dead, rotting on the floor, then lying on the after action report has proven effective.

 

[CarmelHP]

Crazy tax Protestor Argument #5:
The income tax is voluntary.

This is a corruption of statements made by the IRS, the courts, and Congress to encourage taxpayer compliance with the tax laws, without the need for legal action against taxpayers.
A quotation frequently taken out of context by tax protesters is the following by the U.S. Supreme Court:

“Our tax system is based upon voluntary assessment and payment and not upon distraint.”​

Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 175.
This quotation is out of context, because the court first noted that the government could collect the tax by exercising its power of distraint, “but we cannot believe that completing resort to this extraordinary procedure is either wise or in accord with congressional intent.” 362 U.S. at 175. In other words, Congress can collect taxes by force, but the court believed that Congress intended to give taxpayers an opportunity to comply before exercising that force.
This is better explained in Helvering v. Mitchell, (which was cited in the Flora decision), as follows:

“In assessing income taxes, the Government relies primarily upon the disclosure by the taxpayer of the relevant facts. This disclosure it requires him to make in his annual return. To ensure full and honest disclosure, to discourage fraudulent attempts to evade the tax, Congress imposes sanctions. Such sanctions may confessedly be either criminal or civil.”​

Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938).
When confronted by claims that income taxes are “voluntary,” courts readily explain that the payment of income tax is mandatory, not optional:

“Appellants’ claim that payment of federal income tax is voluntary clearly lacks substance.”​

United States v. Gerads, 999 F.2d 1255 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. den. 510 U.S. 1193 (1994).

“The payment of income taxes is not optional ... and the average citizen knows that payment of income taxes is legally required.”​

Schiff v. United States, 919 F.2d 830, 834 (2nd Cir. 1990).

“As the cited cases, as well as many others, have made abundantly clear, the following arguments alluded to by the Lonsdales are completely lacking in legal merit and patently frivolous: ... (6) the income tax is voluntary... “​

Lonsdale v. United States, 919 F.2d 1440, 1448 (10th Cir. 1990).

“Any assertion that the payment of income taxes is voluntary is without merit. It is without question that the payment of income taxes is not voluntary. [citations omitted] The assertion that the filing of an income tax return is voluntary is, likewise, frivolous.”​

United States v. Hartman, 915 F.Supp. 1227 (M.D.Fla. 1996).

“Based on his belief that the income tax system is based on voluntary compliance, Beresford wrote the IRS to explain that he had voluntarily chosen not to comply and would not be paying overdue income taxes for 1987, 1988, and 1989. The IRS issued a federal tax lien against him, which it satisfied by withholding $14,609.97 from the sale of Beresford’s house in October 1999. Beresford seeks to recover that sum plus interest and costs. He also seeks a permanent injunction ‘forbidding defendant from contacting him against his wishes and from directly or indirectly interfering in any other aspect of his life.’ Complaint at 11. ... Beresford’s primary contention, however, that the federal income tax system is based on voluntary compliance, has been held to be ‘completely lacking in legal merit and patently frivolous.’”​

Steven M. Beresford v. IRS, et al., 86 AFTR2d [FONT=Times New Roman, serif]¶[/FONT]2000-5200, No. 00-293-KI (July 13, 2000).

“The federal income tax is not voluntary, and a person may not elect to opt out of the federal tax laws by a unilateral act of revocation and recission.”​

United States v. John L. Sasscer, 86 AFTR2d [FONT=Times New Roman, serif]¶[/FONT]2000-5317, 2000 TNT 186-76, No. Y-97-3026 (D.C. Md. 8/25/2000), (footnote omitted).

“Upon review of May’s amended peition, we find no allegations of fact which could give rise to a valid claim; rather, the complaint merely contains conclusory assertions attacking the constitutionality of the Internal Revenue Code and its application to the taxpayer.[Footnote omitted.] Tax protest cases like this one raise no genuine controversy; the underlying legal issues have long been settled. See, e.g., Abrams, 82 T.C. at 406-07 (citing cases rejecting similar arguments). Because May’s petition raised no justiciable claims, the Tax Court properly dismissed the petition for failure to state a claim.”​

May v. C.I.R., 752 F.2d 1301, 1302 (8th Cir. 1985), (among other things, May’s amended complaint alleged that “The filing of an ‘imcome’ [sic] tax return is ‘VOLUNTARY’ and penalties can not be instituted against a voluntary act since to do so would make the act ‘mandatory.’” 752 F.2d at 1304, note 3).

“His [Harris’s] claims that the payment of federal income taxes is voluntary, and that the IRS fraudulently induced him to pay his taxes by withholding that fact, are clearly without merit.”​

Harris v. Irene Kinahan, et al., 87 AFTR2d [FONT=Times New Roman, serif]¶[/FONT]2001-984, No. 00-5258 (3rd Cir. 18 May 2001).
See also, United States v. Raymond, 228 F.3d 804, 812 (7th Cir. 2000); Hyslep v. United States, 765 F.2d 1083, 1084 (11th Cir. 1985); Ginter v. Southern, 611 F.2d 1226, 1229 & n.2 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. den., 446 U.S. 967 (1980); Funk v. Commissioner, 687 F.2d 264, 265 (8th Cir. 1982); Lesoon v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 141 F.3d 1185, 1998 WL 166114 (10th Cir. 1998); Damron v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 18 F. Supp. 2d 812, 819-20 (E.D. Tenn. 1998), aff’d, 188 F.3d 506 (6th Cir. 1999); Wilcox v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 848 F.2d 1007, 1008 (9th Cir. 1988).
The claims that “(1) Compliance with the internal revenue laws is voluntary or optional and not required by law, including arguments that: a. Filing a Federal tax or information return or paying tax is purely voluntary under the law,” or similar arguments described as frivolous in Rev. Rul. 2007-20, 2007-14 I.R.B. 863, has been identified by the IRS as a “frivolous position” that can result in a penalty of $5,000 when asserted in a tax return or included in certain collection-related submissions. Notice 2007-30, 2007-14 I.R.B. 883.

 

[evansvillethompsongunner]

Yes I remember what your talking about. The city had SWAT enter the house and the house was on a hill. The guy had the advantage and began shooting at SWAT with a 300 winchester magnum. I believe he also put steel plating behind the walls in his house.

That's what I call disgruntled - and well-prepared.

In 1998, the IRS bought $1,200,000 worth of shotguns and pistols for their customer service representatives.

To better serve us...

 

[evansvillethompsongunner]

No, it's better to have your eyes wide open and try to educate yourself about the people you vote for. Like Dr. Paul.
I can't change anything in the legislature, but a group of like-minded Ron Paul types in Congress can.
Don't misunderstand...I'm a borderline conscientious objector as far as voting goes...at least until they add "none of the above" on the ballot. But when a candidate is the right person for the task at hand in my opinion, I fully support them.

Ron Paul isn't the solution, nor is an army of Congressmen like him the answer any more than putting more scorpions in your backyard is the answer to home defense. Ron Paul is better than most politicians, but he's still a Statist - and, moreover, one opposed to women's rights and abortion.
Someone who refuses to allow an individual to exercise all their rights, particularly as justification for some murky 'greater good' or because it would offend some murderous deity is not someone who champions individual rights, but rather, a tyrant who wishes to be seen as a champion of individual rights.

To hell with all the Congress, Ron Paul included.

"Be wary who would not take interest in politic - for politic may yet take interest in you." - Tacitus

 

[evansvillethompsongunner]

Crazy tax Protestor Argument #2:

"The Sixteenth Amendment was never ratified."​

The Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides:​

U.S. Constitution, amendment XVI ​

The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration.
The original Constitution required direct taxes to be apportioned among the states in accordance with population. An income tax is not so apportioned, so the amendment was needed to authorize such parts of the income tax as would constitute "direct" taxes.
Some tax protestors claim that this amendment is not really part of the Constitution -- it was never ratified! Therefore, they say, the income tax is unconstitutional. This argument was popularized by Bill Benson in a book called "The Law That Never Was."
Surprisingly enough, this argument has a little something to it. When the Sixteenth Amendment was ratified by state legislatures in the early twentieth century, the versions that some states voted on contained minor textual errors. Some of them neglected to capitalize the word "States," one had "income" in place of "incomes," one said "remuneration" instead of "enumeration," one said "levy" instead of "lay," and so on.
If the states didn't all vote on the same, identical text for the Sixteenth Amendment, can the amendment really be considered ratified? When Congress makes a law, the House and the Senate must vote on the same text. Similarly, if the states didn't vote on the right text, one could argue that they didn't ratify the amendment. No Sixteenth Amendment, no income tax.
However, it seems that the amendment really was ratified. The alleged defects in the ratification process were considered at the time of ratification in 1913. The Solicitor of the Department of State convincingly explained why the minor textual variations in the versions the states voted on should be disregarded.
First, it seems that the state legislatures intended to ratify the amendment as proposed by Congress. They understood themselves to be voting to approve the proposed Sixteenth Amendment. The text set forth in their instruments of ratification was for recitation purposes only. The errors in the text were not proposals to change the text being ratified; they were just inadvertent errors that do not detract from the intention of the state legislatures to ratify the amendment as proposed.
Benson denies this. He claims that states deliberately altered the text of the proposed amendment. But the evidence just isn't there. In one of his court filings, Benson singles out Oklahoma as a particularly clear case. He says the facts "unequivocally show that Oklahoma intentionally amended what the United States Congress had proposed" (see page 2 of Benson's filing). But looking at Benson's own book (pp. 61-67), one can see that the Oklahoma legislature adopted what it called "A resolution ratifying an amendment proposed by the sixty-first Congress of the United States" (emphasis added). This resolution then begins its ratification by reciting that "Whereas . . . Congress . . . on Monday the fifteenth day of March, one thousand nine hundred and nine, by joint resolution proposed an amendment to the constitution of the United States, in words and figures as follows:" Then, it's true, the resolution misstates the text of the amendment (and pretty badly too). But it sure looks as though the Oklahoma legislators thought they were ratifying the amendment that Congress had proposed on the specified date and just misstated it. So even in a case that Benson himself singles out, it seems quite clear that the state legislature thought it was ratifying the Sixteenth Amendment, not proposing to change it.
Indeed, the states, when voting on a constitutional amendment, have no power to make changes to the amendment's text. They can only vote yes or no on the text that Congress has proposed to them. The stituation is not comparable to the passage of a bill through Congress, where either house can make amendments. Therefore, as the Solicitor of State noted, it "seems a necessary presumption, in the absence of an express stipulation to the contrary, that a legislature did not intend to do something that it had not the power to do, but rather that it intended to do something that it had the power to do, namely, where its action has been affirmative, to ratify the amendment proposed by Congress."
Moreover, as the Solicitor noted, similar textual problems had occurred in the state ratifications of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and those amendments had long been regarded as ratified. The applicable precedents, therefore, suggest that, where a state legislature votes to ratify a proposed amendment to the Constitution, minor textual errors in the recitation of the amendment in the state's instrument of ratification are to be disregarded.
Thus, it seems that the amendment really was ratified.
In addition, there is a strong argument that the declaration of the effectiveness of the amendment, made by Secretary of State Phliander Knox in 1913, must be considered definitive. The Secretary of State was at that time the government official charged with determining whether an amendment to the Constitution has been ratified (today it's the Archivist of the United States). The courts, although regarding themselves as empowered to determine the meaning of the Constitution and the laws, generally regard themselves as not competent to say what the definitive text of the Constitution and the laws is. When the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate certify that Congress has enacted a certain bill text into law, the courts will not question whether that really happened: they will not inquire into whether the House and the Senate really voted on the proper text. This is known as the "enrolled bill rule." Similarly, the Supreme Court has held that when the Secretary of State certifies that an amendment to the Constitution has been ratified, no court is empowered to look behind that claim to determine whether it was really ratified. E.g., Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922). So whatever might have been the problem with the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment, the Secretary of State considered it and decided that the amendment really was ratified, and that's it.
Finally, it is worth noting that the Sixteenth Amendment has been around for nearly 100 years now and has been considered and applied by courts, including the Supreme Court, in innumerable cases. As one court put it, "While this alone is not sufficient to bar judicial inquiry, it is very persuasive on the question of validity." It would take an extraordinarily strong argument to show that everyone has been wrong all this time, and the argument from minor textual problems in the ratification instruments just isn't strong enough.
For all these reasons, it seems clear that the Sixteenth Amendment really is part of the Constitution.
Certainly that has been the uniform holding of the courts in cases in which this argument has been raised. For some representative cases, see United States v. Benson, 941 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1991) (rejecting these arguments in a criminal case brought against the author of the "Law that Never Was" book); United States v. Foster, 789 F.2d 457 (7th Cir. 1986); Cook v. Spillman, 806 F.2d 948 (9th Cir. 1986) (calling the argument that the Sixteenth Amendment was never ratified "frivolous" and imposing sanctions of $1,500 on the party making it); United States v. House, 617 F.Supp. 237, 238-39 (W.D. Mich.1985).
So while this argument is not as utterly absurd as most tax protestor arguments, one can be confident that it would not succeed in any actual court proceeding.
​

AND, FURTHER

Although the Constitution describes how to ratify amendments, it doesn’t say who is supposed to keep track of the ratification process and let us know when the required three-fourths of the states have ratified an amendment. After some confusion about the status of some amendments (including the infamous “Titles of Nobility” amendment that fell at least one state short of ratification, but appeared in numerous copies of the Constitution in the early and middle 1800s), Congress decided that the Secretary of State should certify what amendments have been ratified. Congress proposed the 16th Amendment on July 12, 1909, and, on February 3, 1913, Secretary of State Philander Knox certified that it had been ratified.
According to the Office of the Law Revision Counsel of the U. S. House of Representatives, the dates of ratification by the states were (chronologically): Alabama, August 10, 1909; Kentucky, February 8, 1910; South Carolina, February 19, 1910; Illinois, March 1, 1910; Mississippi, March 7, 1910; Oklahoma, March 10, 1910; Maryland, April 8, 1910; Georgia, August 3, 1910; Texas, August 16, 1910; Ohio, January 19, 1911; Idaho, January 20, 1911; Oregon, January 23, 1911; Washington, January 26, 1911; Montana, January 30, 1911; Indiana, January 30, 1911; California, January 31, 1911; Nevada, January 31, 1911; South Dakota, February 3, 1911; Nebraska, February 9, 1911; North Carolina, February 11, 1911; Colorado, February 15, 1911; North Dakota, February 17, 1911; Kansas, February 18, 1911; Michigan, February 23, 1911; Iowa, February 24, 1911; Missouri, March 16, 1911; Maine, March 31, 1911; Tennessee, April 7, 1911; Arkansas, April 22, 1911 (after having rejected it earlier); Wisconsin, May 26, 1911; New York, July 12, 1911; Arizona, April 6, 1912; Minnesota, June 11, 1912; Louisiana, June 28, 1912; West Virginia, January 31, 1913; New Mexico, February 3, 1913. The amendment was subsequently ratified by Massachusetts, March 4, 1913; New Hampshire, March 7, 1913 (after having rejected it on March 2, 1911). The amendment was rejected (and not subsequently ratified) by Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Utah.
The argument that the 16th Amendment was not ratified is best explained (and refuted) by this quotation from U.S. v. Thomas, 788 F.2d 1250 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. den. 107 S.Ct. 187 (1986):

“Thomas is a tax protester, and one of his arguments is that he did not need to file tax returns because the sixteenth amendment is not part of the constitution. It was not properly ratified, Thomas insists, repeating the argument of W. Benson & M. Beckman, The Law That Never Was (1985). Benson and Beckman review the documents concerning the states’ ratification of the sixteenth amendment and conclude that only four states ratified the sixteenth amendment; they insist that the official promulgation of that amendment by Secretary of State Knox in 1913 is therefore void.

“Benson and Beckman did not discover anything; they rediscovered something that Secretary Knox considered in 1913. Thirty-eight states ratified the sixteenth amendment, and thirty-seven sent formal instruments of ratification to the Secretary of State. (Minnesota notified the Secretary orally, and additional states ratified later; we consider only those Secretary Knox considered.) Only four instruments repeat the language of the sixteenth amendment exactly as Congress approved it. The others contain errors of diction, capitalization, punctuation, and spelling. The text Congress transmitted to the states was: “The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration.” Many of the instruments neglected to capitalize “States,” and some capitalized other words instead. The instrument from Illinois had “remuneration” in place of “enumeration”; the instrument from Missouri substituted “levy” for “lay”; the instrument from Washington had “income” not “incomes”; others made similar blunders.

“Thomas insists that because the states did not approve exactly the same text, the amendment did not go into effect. Secretary Knox considered this argument. The Solicitor of the Department of State drew up a list of the errors in the instruments and--taking into account both the triviality of the deviations and the treatment of earlier amendments that had experienced more substantial problems--advised the Secretary that he was authorized to declare the amendment adopted. The Secretary did so.

“Although Thomas urges us to take the view of several state courts that only agreement on the literal text may make a legal document effective, the Supreme Court follows the “enrolled bill rule.” If a legislative document is authenticated in regular form by the appropriate officials, the court treats that document as properly adopted. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 36 L.Ed. 294, 12 S.Ct. 495 (1892). The principle is equally applicable to constitutional amendments. See Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 66 L.Ed. 505, 42 S.Ct. 217 (1922), which treats as conclusive the declaration of the Secretary of State that the nineteenth amendment had been adopted. In United States v. Foster, 789 F.2d. 457, 462-463, n.6 (7th Cir. 1986), we relied on Leser, as well as the inconsequential nature of the objections in the face of the 73-year acceptance of the effectiveness of the sixteenth amendment, to reject a claim similar to Thomas’. See also Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 83 L. Ed. 1385, 59 S. Ct. 972 (1939) (questions about ratification of amendments may be nonjusticiable). Secretary Knox declared that enough states had ratified the sixteenth amendment. The Secretary’ decision is not transparently defective. We need not decide when, if ever, such a decision may be reviewed in order to know that Secretary Knox’ decision is now beyond review.”​

U.S. v. Thomas, 788 F.2d 1250 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. den. 107 S.Ct. 187 (1986).
It has also been claimed that the votes of Georgia legislature were recorded incorrectly and that Georgia actually rejected the amendment, contrary to Knox’ report. However, no Congressman or other official from Georgia has ever complained about the “error” and, even if there was an error and Georgia did not ratify the amendment, there would still have been thirty-seven ratifications, one more than the thirty-six required. (Article V of the Constitution requires that amendments to the Constitution be approved by the legislatures of three fourths of the states, and there were forty-eight states in 1913.)
Another claim is that the ratification of the 16th Amendment by several states was invalid because the constitutions of those states prohibited an income tax. A similar argument as to the 19th Amendment has been flatly rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court in connection with a different constitutional amendment:

“The second contention is that in the Constitutions of several of the 36 states named in the proclamation of the Secretary of State there are provisions which render inoperative the alleged ratifications by their Legislatures. The argument is that by reason of these specific provisions the Legislatures were without power to ratify. But the function of a state Legislature in ratifying a proposed amendment to the federal Constitution, like the function of Congress in proposing the amendment, is a federal function derived from the federal Constitution; and it transcends any limitations sought to be imposed by the people of a state.”​

Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 136-137 (1922).
These technical arguments against the ratification of the 16th Amendment are troubling because they are so undemocratic (as are many other tax protester arguments). Except for a couple of claims about the votes of two states, there is really no doubt that Congress proposed an amendment that would give it the power to tax incomes, and that three fourths of the states approved the amendment. But tax protesters would like for the courts to nullify the amendment, and so nullify the power of Congress and the states to amend the Constitution, and so deny to the people the power to govern themselves, because of typographical errors.
But can courts even consider attacks on the validity of constitutional amendments? As noted by the 7th Circuit in Thomas, the argument that the 16th Amendment is invalid is not only legally and factually wrong, but it is an argument that federal courts are unable (or at least reluctant) to consider. The federal courts have always recognized limits upon their powers, and one of those limits is that the courts should not get involved in issues that the Constitution has entrusted to other branches of the government. The Constitution says that Congress may propose amendments, and the states may ratify them. Whether an amendment has been properly ratified is considered to be a “political question” to be resolved by Congress and the states, and not in court. In a challenge to the validity of the 19th Amendment, the Supreme Court ruled that official notices of the state legislatures to the Secretary of State were “binding upon him, and, being certified by his proclamation, is conclusive upon the courts.” Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 137 (1922).
Other decisions confirming (or refusing to consider) the validity of the 16th Amendment:

“Despite plaintiff’ and numerous other tax protesters’ contention that the Sixteenth Amendment was never ratified, courts have long recognized the Sixteenth Amendment’ ratification and validity.”​

Betz v. United States, 40 Fed.Cl. 286, 295 (1998).

“As the cited cases, as well as many others, have made abundantly clear, the following arguments alluded to by the Lonsdales are completely lacking in legal merit and patently frivolous: .. .. (4) the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution is either invalid or applies only to corporations . . . .”​

Lonsdale v. United States, 919 F.2d 1440, 1448 (10th Cir. 1990).
See also, United States v. Foster, 789 F.2d 457 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. den. 107 S.Ct. 273; Pollard v. Commissioner, 816 F.2d 603 (11th Cir. 1987); United States v. Benson, 941 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1991); Sochia v. Commissioner, 23 F.3d 941 (5th Cir. 1994), reh. den. 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 22014; United States v. Stahl, 792 F.2d 1438 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. den. 107 S.Ct. 888; United State v. Sitka, 845 F.2d 43 (2nd Cir. 1988); Miller v. United States, 868 F.2d 236, 239-41 (7th Cir. 1989); Biermann v. Commissioner, 769 F.2d 707 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v. Buckner, 830 F.2d 102 (1987); United States v. Dube, 820 F.2d 886, 891 (7th Cir. 1986); Coleman v. Commissioner, 791 F.2d 68, 70-71 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v. Moore, 627 F.2d 830, 833 (7th Cir. 1980); Knoblauch v. Commissioner, 749 F.2d 200, 201 (1984) (“Every court that has considered this argument has rejected it.”), cert. den. 474 U.S. 830 (1985); United States v. Matheson, (9th Cir. 1986); Lysiak v. Commissioner, 816 F.2d 311, 312 (7th Cir. 1987); Quijano v. United States, 93 F.3d 26, 30 (1st Cir. 1996); United States v. Mundt, 29 F.3d 233, 237 (6th Cir. 1994).
In Rev. Rul. 2005-19, 2005-14 I.R.B. 819, the IRS confirmed that the argument that the 16th Amendment was never properly ratified is “frivolous” and reliance on it can result in civil and criminal penalties.
The claim that “[t]he Sixteenth Amendment was not ratified, has no effect, contradicts the Constitution as originally ratified, lacks an enabling clause, or does not authorize a non-apportioned, direct income tax” has been identified by the IRS as a “frivolous position” that can result in a penalty of $5,000 when asserted in a tax return or included in certain collection-related submissions. Notice 2007-30, 2007-14 I.R.B. 883.
Tax Protester “Evidence”

A related (and even sillier) claim made by tax protesters is that the ratification of the 16th Amendment by Ohio was invalid because Ohio did not become a state until 1953(!). This strange claim is based on a strange action that Congress took in 1953 to confirm that Ohio was indeed a state. Briefly:

1. By an act of April 30, 1802 (2 Stat. 173), section 1, Congress provided that “the inhabitants of the eastern division of the territory northwest of the river Ohio, be, and they are hereby authorized to form for themselves a constitution and state government, and to assume such name as they shall deem proper, and the said state, when formed, shall be admitted into the Union, upon the same footing with the original states, in all respects whatsoever.” (This was consistent with the Northwest Territory Ordinance of 1787, which provided that there should be formed from the territory at least three but not more than five states.)
2. A convention met in Ohio on November 1, 1802, and adopted a constitution on November 29, 1802.
3. On January 19, 1803, a special committee of Congress reported that “the said Constitution and government so formed is republican, and in conformity to the principles contained in the articles of the ordinance made on the 13th day of July 1787, for the Government of the said Territory: and that it is now necessary to establish a district court within the said State, to carry into complete effect the laws of the United States within the same.” Annals of Congress, 7th Cong., 2d sess., p. 21.
4. Congress then enacted legislation to declare that all of the laws of the United States shall be in force within the state of Ohio and to establish a federal district court in Ohio, stating in the preamble that “the said state has become one of the United States of America.” Act of February 19, 1803 (2 Stat. 201).
5. Ohio began sending Representatives and Senators to Congress, began voting in Presidential elections, and has been considered to be a state ever since.

So what’ the problem? When Ohio was preparing for the 150th anniversary of its statehood, researchers discovered that they couldn’t establish the exact date that Ohio became a state, and that there was some confusion on the issue. For example, the Senate Manual (S. Doc. 5, 82d Cong., p. 570) gave the date as March 3, 1803, while the Congressional Biographical Directory (H. Doc. 607, 81st Cong., p. 76, note 9) gave the date as November 29, 1802. Further research showed that Ohio was unique because Congress declared that Ohio would become a state upon fulfilling certain conditions but had never formally declared that the conditions had been met. In admitting other states, Congress either declared that the state would be admitted as of a certain date, or passed an enabling act and then later declared that the state was admitted. In the case of Ohio, Congress passed an enabling act but never formally declared that the conditions of the enabling act had been met, either due to an oversight or due to a belief that a formal declaration was not intended and not needed.
In a 1953 report to Congress, the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress stated that the lack of a formal resolution “may be considered unessential.” (1953 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2126, 2128.) However, Ohio asked for a formal declaration, sending a new petition for statehood to Washington by horseback (yes, in 1953), and Congress complied (with a certain number of snide jokes), passing a joint resolution that declared Ohio to be one of the United States of America as of March 1, 1803. P.L. 82-204, 67 Stat. 407. The Senate Report to the resolution states that the purpose was “to make formal, legal declaration of the de facto situation with respect to the admission of Ohio as a State of the United States.” Senate Report No. 720, 1953 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2124.
So the fact of the matter was that Ohio was accepted as a state of the United States sometime in 1802 or 1803 and Congress declared the admission to be as of a certain date in 1803, but the declaration was not made until 1953.
The argument that Ohio was not a state until 1953 was rejected in Knoblauch v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 749 F2d 200, 201-202 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. den., 474 U.S. 830 (1986), and in Bowman v. Government of the United States, 920 F.Supp. 623, 625 n. 4 (E.D. Pa. 1995).

Legal studies was one of my two majors in college.

tl;dr

 

[JetGirl]

moreover, one opposed to women's rights and abortion.

I've heard him speak a couple times (interviews and such) and I didn't get that at all.

 

[Fletch]

I've heard him speak a couple times (interviews and such) and I didn't get that at all.

It's true, but it's a footnote and he's not half the anti-abortion crusader some folks here are. When a man's overall message and action has been the deconstruction of government, and consistently so, I'm willing to leave aside the points of disagreement until they actually come up in legislative terms.

 

[Fletch]

Legal studies was one of my two majors in college.

tl;dr

Dude, it's bad enough we get wall-o'-texted in the originals... Do you really have to quote them?

 

[theweakerbrother]

I've heard him speak a couple times (interviews and such) and I didn't get that at all.

It depends on what definition one has of 'women's rights.'

He isn't saying you can't vote or that women should wear burkhas... he recognizes that a fetus has rights. Notice I didn't say baby. The definition of fetus (in womb) and baby (outside womb) has evolved into a degrees of 'aliveness' in the world of politics. It seems that Ron Paul wants to remove the social differences between the two. So really, women's rights, in this instance, can be translated as the right to have an abortion.

Ron Paul on the Issues

Abortion | Ron Paul .com

*NOTE*

My posting of Ron Paul's stance is no indication of mine. If you don't like what he has to say, don't flame me! His libertarian non-aggression stance has so been translated by his philosophy that this also applies to fetuses.

 

[ocsdor]

Ron Paul, as a young OB/GYN, was instructed to participate in an abortion as part of his training. The acts that he witnessed during this training disgusted him so much that he refused to ever participate in it again.

 

[JetGirl]

It's true, but it's a footnote and he's not half the anti-abortion crusader some folks here are. When a man's overall message and action has been the deconstruction of government, and consistently so, I'm willing to leave aside the points of disagreement until they actually come up in legislative terms.

Point taken.