A critical look at the ERSM / Route Irish ambush

[the1kidd03]

I forgot about that. That would also limit what they can use. I had a few aquaintences working with various groups over there -blackwater, triple canopy, custer battles (before custer got into all that trouble), etc. Their "kit" consisted of M4s and Beretta 92s.

One of them had either saws or m60s mounted to the back of heavy pickup trucks but I was told that a lot depended on the company. Some took care of their people better than others but none of them ever really complained.

The belief was it was their choice to work with a company or not. If they thought the money wasn't worth the risk they would go with a different company or not go at all.

Yeah, pretty much. The contracts (for employment that is) are relatively short. Sometimes as little as 3 months, but they pay really well which is why most do it. They have a pretty good idea of what's involved before they sign anything.

The government determines what they deem necessary to complete the job and then list that as items they will provide/approve to acquire (at a cost) to the contracting agency. You (as the agency) are to include that cost into your bid for the contract. Yet again, bidding doesn't always yield the best results necessarily. Sometimes those RFPs are written in such detail I don't understand how anyone can compete for them, but it is what it is and we're taking this thread off topic. LOL

 

[thebishopp]

Ok back on topic:

In addition to deciding ahead of time if one is going to try and blend (which means not making oneself a target by firing rounds into the air to warn other vehicles):

It would probably be a good idea for individuals to be familiar with their equipment.

In this particular case it is my understanding that the driver in vehicle one was not a competent "manual" driver. He should never have been assigned the position. Teams should make assignments based upon skills whenever possible.

Now sometimes one may be assigned equipment/vehicles they are not familiar with. If that should happen then, if one has the time, one needs to familiarize themselves as much as possible whenever possible.

In this case the driver of Vehicle one effectively disabled his own vehicle due to an aching "calf" muscle.

 

[the1kidd03]

Ok back on topic:

In addition to deciding ahead of time if one is going to try and blend (which means not making oneself a target by firing rounds into the air to warn other vehicles):

It would probably be a good idea for individuals to be familiar with their equipment.

In this particular case it is my understanding that the driver in vehicle one was not a competent "manual" driver. He should never have been assigned the position. Teams should make assignments based upon skills whenever possible.

Now sometimes one may be assigned equipment/vehicles they are not familiar with. If that should happen then, if one has the time, one needs to familiarize themselves as much as possible whenever possible.

In this case the driver of Vehicle one effectively disabled his own vehicle due to an aching "calf" muscle.

Or the least skilled person shouldn't be the LEAD vehicle at least..

 

[T.Lex]

You guys know that there are other reports, right?

There were also "General Comments" by Mr. Yeager, and a report by Scott Traudt. Both address more generally the situation and lifestyle of some of the operators there. (They can generously be characterized as "unprofessional.")

I have them, but I believe they are also available here:
Index of /stories/biap

 

[45calibre]

You guys know that there are other reports, right?

There were also "General Comments" by Mr. Yeager, and a report by Scott Traudt. Both address more generally the situation and lifestyle of some of the operators there. (They can generously be characterized as "unprofessional.")

I have them, but I believe they are also available here:
Index of /stories/biap

i was just about to ask that. all of the survivors should have made AARs correct?

 

[45calibre]

according to this report the majority of the team and company was full of fail.

james yeager general comments: operation apollo
http://www.defensereview.com/stories/biap/Yeager%20General%20comments%20on%20the%20failings%20of%20Operation%20Apollo.pdf

 

[HICKMAN]

I read this:

http://www.defensereview.com/storie...ments on the failings of Operation Apollo.pdf

some time back and it's more or less why I think of JY the way I do.

 

[45calibre]

scott traudt also had a report on team and company failures

http://www.defensereview.com/stories/biap/Scott Traudt 04-05-2005 Letter.rtf

 

[T.Lex]

I tend not to be very judgmental, and I don't think JY should be judged based on this incident. His actions, and those of all the decisionmakers, can be evaluated, but that's different than a personal judgment.

From the docs I read, I think JY is conscientious and, along with a few others, was trying to do a professional job in a challenging environment. I think the evaluation needs to be split into 2 parts - the preparation and the incident.

In terms of preparation, it sounds like he (and the few others like him) were fighting an uphill battle. They did the best they could. The ones that didn't prepare, and hampered preparation, did much less than the best that they could. And people died, probably because of the lack of preparation.

In terms of the incident, JY made some mistakes, did some other things appropriately, but maintained composure while getting shot at. Could he have made different choices? Sure. But, the ones he made were reasonable. It would have been better to have a more though-out SOP for what to do, but that goes back to the preparation evaluation.

(Don't mind me, I'm not tactical, but I'm kinda a process-improvement kinda guy. I will not ever claim to be a subject-matter expert on the tactical side of things, so discount whatever I say accordingly.)

 

[HICKMAN]

I tend not to be very judgmental, and I don't think JY should be judged based on this incident. His actions, and those of all the decisionmakers, can be evaluated, but that's different than a personal judgment.

From the docs I read, I think JY is conscientious and, along with a few others, was trying to do a professional job in a challenging environment. I think the evaluation needs to be split into 2 parts - the preparation and the incident.

In terms of preparation, it sounds like he (and the few others like him) were fighting an uphill battle. They did the best they could. The ones that didn't prepare, and hampered preparation, did much less than the best that they could. And people died, probably because of the lack of preparation.

In terms of the incident, JY made some mistakes, did some other things appropriately, but maintained composure while getting shot at. Could he have made different choices? Sure. But, the ones he made were reasonable. It would have been better to have a more though-out SOP for what to do, but that goes back to the preparation evaluation.

(Don't mind me, I'm not tactical, but I'm kinda a process-improvement kinda guy. I will not ever claim to be a subject-matter expert on the tactical side of things, so discount whatever I say accordingly.)

You summed up basically everything I was going to say.

And I'm still taking Fighting Pistol at TR this coming year.

 

[esrice]

Thanks to those who have provided links to additional resources. I'll be checking them out later tonight.

And thanks to those who have chosen to take part in this thread in such an academic manner.

 

[thebishopp]

You guys know that there are other reports, right?

There were also "General Comments" by Mr. Yeager, and a report by Scott Traudt. Both address more generally the situation and lifestyle of some of the operators there. (They can generously be characterized as "unprofessional.")

I have them, but I believe they are also available here:
Index of /stories/biap

Those were not addressed because we were trying not to get into the whole Yeager versus ESRM debate and focus purely on the tactics involved in the incident themselves.

It's also one of the reasons kid and I stopped talking about the contractual nature of what weapons they can or can't use, etc. etc. because that was also off topic.

Of course I am not surprised that the Yeager supporters would be the first to intentionally use this thread to start trying to support him again.

The fact is that while the letter from Traudt focuses on what he perceives as the problems with the leadership of Apollo 1. This is not pertaining to the incident that occurred on Irish but more so to do with his disagreements with said leadership.

One of the reasons, as I stated, I hesitated to put up Yeager's AAR was that it would detract from the analysis of the tactics employed and would again turn into a who is lying debate.

Well let's settle that. According to a statement that Yeager supposedly put up on his own website he has retracted without reservation anything negative he has ever said about ESRM. That would include comments regarding his fellow team mates and his questioning of their capabilities. Any real "warrior" (IMO) would not retract his statements if he knew they were true. That would not be "being true to oneself" as Mr. Yeager stated was part of being a "warrior".

Now if Mr. Yeager wishes to get on here and say that he was not the author of or did not post the following then that would be great and could be part of another thread.


"From tacticalresponse


I am committed to the highest standards in all my dealings. I consider myself part of an extended community of professionals operating and working in the most dangerous situations on a daily basis. I regard the operators at every level and division of Edinburgh Risk and Security Management [ERSM] in all its spheres of operation as highly skilled, dedicated, professional members of the extended community of men and women engaged in critical security and enforcement functions.

It detracts from the work and focus of us all to spend time on unnecessary rifts within the community we share. In that interest, I shall engage in no further public or private discussion, comment, or analysis of any kind concerning ERSM, or its operators, or its companies, or personnel, or operations in any forum, worldwide, past, present, or future.

I also direct that every past and existing discussion, comment, input, or analysis by me of any ERSM matter in any forum to which I have contributed whatsoever immediately be removed completely and totally. This directive includes removal of all video, audio, and photographic material and data in any medium.
This decision and directive is made in the critical interest of refocusing us all on the life and death situations we face. Our need to support each other in those situations demands no less. Any suggestion of any kind that ERSM operations have not been or are not now totally and professionally focused on the tasks they perform in this effort should be stricken from the record.

I hereby retract without exception any and all statements of whatever kind attributable to me in any forum and in any medium, which statements in any manner reflect negatively on ERSM in any way.
/s/ James Yeager"


---

it seems that james yeager was one of the few with his head on straight

Yes according to Yeager he was the best operator there. Everyone else were a bunch of incompetent blowhards. To me his "comments" read like one of his videos.

As I read the reports on page one, I tried to visualize the incident as it unfolded. I think I can understand how the more critical could conclude JY abandoned his buddies. un But from what I read, he believed he was doing as he was instructed to do. Additionally, if his superiors had believed he failed his assignments, their report would have said so.

Yes Yeager, in his supposed reports, claims he did what he did because it was SOP, heck we even have people on here claiming Yeager did it for reasons that he did NOT put in his reports (like to give Mr. Collen the rear wheel position).

Since we are now back on the "who is lying" aspect of this situation (Yeager versus the Company)...

One of the reasons I give more credence to the company AAR is the consistency and professionalism in it versus Yeager's claims (keep in mind that Yeager "supposedly" even issued a complete retraction of his comments). What is important to note is that there is NOTHING available from the surviving members of that team where any one of them come forward supporting Yeager.

The report does criticize Yeager. In addition to the emergency brake, it comments on moving before establishing fire superiority as well as moving to a position where one is not able to engage the enemy.

"James Yeager in accordance with the team SOP attempted to break contact in the opening stages of the contact yet fire superiority and or suppression had at that time not been established. Ian Harris and Mark Collen, each under heavy enemy fire, were the only two individuals during the contact who attempted to suppress enemy forces."

"James Yeager was in a location at the median where he could not engage enemy forces as he did no have a line of fire from his location."

Everyone else was "doing something" either trying to maneuver to provide support, engaging the enemy, or providing medical care, the only one who took action that took him totally out of the fight was Mr. Yeager. Hell even Surrette, who was dying, was fighting.

Whatever the reasons, Yeager moved himself to a position where he was unable to provide support for his team mates and stayed there until the fight was over. He was the only person to take himself out of the fight and remain out of the fight for the duration. That is in the report as well as the video. Period.

Now we can argue all day over if he did so out of fear, panic, confusion, or his claims of following sop.

 

[T.Lex]

Fair enough. As an admitted non-"been there, done that" armchair tactician, but also as a process-improvement guy, it is nearly impossible for me to completely divorce the "doing" of something from the "training" for the doing of something.

I've never fired a weapon in anger (ok, anger management maybe) nor been to an active war zone. But processes are processes, and evaluations are evaluations.

Before an assessment of what his tactics in that situation were, I think it is important to define what the different expectations were: the company's, his, and his fellow operators, and maybe even the expectations of the military units in the area. Those expectations, to the extent they were communicated, would be the subject of training. If they weren't communicated adequately, then that's another systemic issue that shifts the assessment criteria.

I will continue to apologize if I am way off base. But, in a "past life" I did have some experience with military training. The goal was to make training as real as possible. It was in that process that I received the JY BIAP materials (and others).

That is not NEARLY the same as being there, and I would never claim that it was. But, it helped me reach the perspective that process of root cause analysis is the same whether you're trying to find flaws in a manufacturing process or studying how troops react in combat.

Oh, and his "retraction" looks very much like a settlement agreement. I wouldn't be surprised if there was threatened defamation litigation involved, and a confidentiality agreement. That is pure speculation, though, in an area where I think I can be considered a subject-matter expert.

ETA: Oh, and I'm no JY fanboi. In fact, until this past week or so when these threads popped up, my only knowledge of him was from the BIAP reports. I didn't even remember his name until I made the connection.

 

[thebishopp]

EDIT: edited to get back on topic.

Ok so I am not entirely sure they could avoid being "stopped". It is all fine and dandy saying "they shouldn't have stopped" but were they not in a situation where they had no choice?

That being the case...

(AND) Operating under the premise that either a supply or contractual issue prevented heavily armored vehicles (we have no data either which way and despite Yeager's "comments" I am pretty sure he was not privy to the details of the contract itself so he can not speak on such matters):

If I had to identify the two major mistakes that, if they had not occurred, may have reduced the casualties incurred they would be:

1. Firing rounds into the air, despite being what is assumed as standard "sop" for warning away vehicles, is NOT the best tactical maneuver when one's unit/team/squad is not equipped with those things necessary to survive should they draw unwanted attention (as in machine gun fire). In this case heavily armored vehicles with corresponding heavy weapons.

2. Teams should be assigned based upon competency. In this case drivers who don't drive manual transmissions should not be assigned as drivers of manual transmission vehicles.

 

[esrice]

After less than 24 hours this thread was closed due to folks being unable to stay on-topic and continue an intellectual debate. However, after several requests from other members wishing to weigh in on the subject I've decided to re-open it.

The OT posts have been removed and what remains are the posts discussing the incident itself.

Going forward there are a few guidelines that must be followed.

First, I'm going to ask that thebishopp and HICKMAN refrain from addressing each other directly, or from commenting on posts made by each other. Think of it as being on each other's ignore lists (which isn't a bad idea altogether).

Second, I'm going to again insist that all future posts remain on-topic as outlined in the OP.

Third, if you want to comment on specific team member's actions (even JY's) that is acceptable. However I ask that you state your perspective and leave it at that. I don't want to see any arguing about who's opinion is right or wrong. It's a given that there will be some amount of conjecture because we weren't there ourselves and very few of us have direct experience with such matters. If you disagree with someone's take that is OK, as we will see the difference in what people post. But there's no reason to break down each person's post and tell them why they're wrong.

Fourth, please remember that this thread is simply a mental exercise in which we dissect a moment in time and discuss it civilly. Because of the issues already expereinced this thread will be more closely monitored and moderated than most. The arguing, constant back-and-forth, and injection of random silliness only serves to hamper such discussion. Therefore in an effort to give everyone a chance to share their view I will remove such content without notice.

Fifth, if you see a violation of the posting guidelines as I've laid out for this thread please do not attempt to "handle it" yourself. I'll take care of it.

All future postings in this thread I will view as an acceptance to the above guidelines. If you can't follow them please do not post.

Thank you, and I look forward to looking at this incident through the eyes of more INGOers.

 

[the1kidd03]

I watched part of the video last night and was reminded at how "inaccurate" it is of the entire situation. You really cannot tell anything from that video.

Tomorrow, I'll try to read through the various other content posted to see if there's anything specific which should have been addressed (based on my training/knowledge of course).

Thanks for re-opening

 

[T.Lex]

Thanks @ esrice for reopening this. My brain needs all the mental exercise it can get!

In terms of my past experience analyzing this incident in a training context, I have a couple questions for the "practitioners" here.

What was the "first" tactical "mistake" any member of the team made in this incident? For example, an assessment of JY could start with him engaging the parking brake and forgetting about it. But, what part of that was the mistake: staying stopped in traffic so long that his leg cramped, engaging the parking brake, forgetting it was engaged, or even using a manual car? Or all of it?

For my own purposes, I recognize there was a cascade of mistakes. For now, I'm really only interested in people's opinions about the "first" one.

(I hope this is ok. If not, delete/edit and I'll try again a different way.)

 

[elaw555]

I think the most glaring and first error was made in the planning stage and carried over to be the deciding factor in becoming the target. It seems like much thought and care was taken to blend in. Dress, and vehicle choice were tailored to blending in to the local population. Once in a stopped position on the road however, it seems every effort was made to separate themselves from the local population. I can appreciate the threat of IED attack and the reasons to move out from underneath the overpass but moving forward at the expense of separating yourself from the locals and firing a weapon to warn other locals to stay back essentially made yourself a target of opportunity.

 

[GIJEW]

The SOP needs to be appropriate for the unit size. Trying to deter attack as a "hard target" doesn't sound right for a squad size unit in SUVs (even if they all were armored). An RPG-proof armored SUV doesn't exist, and all their weapons were essentially PDWs, with the exception of the SAW.
In addition to adding 7.62NATO to their gear, there's no reason that a squad --a motorized one at that--shouldn't have some kind of HE weaponry beyond hand grenades--M203 minimum, LAW, RPG. This is particularly true if their SOP requires establishing fire superiority as a requirement for disengageing.

If their intention was to remain incognito then that was obviously a mistake. You can't "conceal" yourself and try blending into the populace while you are also doing things that cause you to stand out.

IMO, if they were going to try to blend in then they needed to do just that. If they wanted to roll like a military convoy then they needed to be in armored vehicles with very visible heavy weapons.

The point of standing out and presenting a hard target is to actually look like a hard target to deter all but the most determined enemy from attacking. The stronger you look the less likely a lesser group will pick you to attack.

I think ESRM's "lessons learned" are on point as well:

LESSONS IDENTIFIED

Many of the lessons identified are well known but it is worth reiterating them:

• If forced to go static on Route IRISH (or any route for that matter) teams need to act in accordance with SOP and immediately evacuate the area.
• If enemy forces initiate fire it is imperative that the team under fire first establish fire superiority prior to breaking contact. It is imperative that team members who have eyes on the enemy call out fire direction, distance and description so as to alert other team members to the enemy location. You can not maneuver until you have established an aggressive base of fire.
• Team Leaders should have no additional duties other than that of team leader.
• Crew Served Weapons must be kept running during the course of the fight. If one goes down due to a wounded or killed operator then that weapon must be immediately put back into action by another team member.
• Every move needs to include at a minimum one weapons system utilizing 7.62 NATO in order to defeat enemy forces employing hard and soft skin vehicles

 

[GIJEW]

The SOP needs to be appropriate for the unit size. Trying to deter attack as a "hard target" doesn't sound right for a squad size unit in SUVs (even if they all were armored). An RPG-proof armored SUV doesn't exist, and all their weapons were essentially PDWs, with the exception of the SAW.
In addition to adding 7.62NATO to their gear, there's no reason that a squad --a motorized one at that--shouldn't have some kind of HE weaponry beyond hand grenades--M203 minimum, LAW, RPG. This is particularly true if their SOP requires establishing fire superiority as a requirement for disengageing.

Sorry about going 'hair-trigger' with the keyboard and restating things previously said.