Well, two families have filed lawsuits against Virginia Tech and others in reference to the mass killing that happened a couple years back. There was a state settlement and when I did the math, everyone who took it ended up with around $350K. The two lawsuits are asking for $10,000,000.00, which I think is actually pretty low considering the Ball State shooting lawsuit was $100M, then during trial opening statements they asked for around $50M, then at closing they asked for about half that amount.
I have downloaded the lawsuits and read the portions which I find interesting, those that claim VaTech and its officials of gross negligence. This is long but if these accusations are true, I don't know why others accepted the settlement. I can easily see how the officials at VaTech tried to "manage" the message. The simple fact is that there was an armed person on the loose, reguardless of if they thought it was the girls boyfriend or not, he was not in custody and could be anywhere. I also find it sickening that the upper admin had their building put on lock-down (and someone from the vet school was likely part of this emergency group and had that building put on lockdown. If there was no danger, why go into lockdown? If there was enough danger for a lockdown, then the entire school should have closed and went into lockdown). There is a part I didn't include. It talks about how in two weeks, VaTech was having a huge fundraising gala in an effort to raise over a billion dollars. While the people lay dead in the building, one of the organizers of the fundraiser actually sent an e-mail saying that while this incident will have ramifications, they could use it to help drive donations.
Here are the bullet points:
#1: On or about 08:00 a.m. on April 16, 2007, President Steger called for the convening of the university’s Emergency Policy Group. Why the 40 minute delay in doing so is unknown. (My text: The first two kids were shot around 0715, with notifications to many officials sent out shortly thereafter.)
#2: Ample time then remained in which to cancel 09:00 a.m. classes and all other classes until the gunman was captured or the campus otherwise cleared of this clear and present danger.
#3: At that time President Steger or his deputy, Executive Vice-President Hyatt had full authority to order and/or issue an alert and warning to the student body and university faculty of the events which had transpired at West Ambler Johnston Hall and warn that the gunman was still at large, presumably armed and dangerous, and might still be on campus, but elected not to do so.
#4: As the time for cancelling 09:00 a.m. classes was approaching neither the Virginia Tech Police Department nor the members of the Emergency Policy Group, including these named defendants, had any information of the killer’s identity or whereabouts.
#5: In anticipation that the killer was still on campus and posed a clear and present danger to the safety of students and faculty, Wendell Flinchum, the Chief of Police for the Virginia Tech Police Department, initially ordered the assembly of the Emergency Response Team (ERT, a/k/a SWAT) at 8:15 a.m. For reasons unrelated to the safety of students and faculty, Defendant Flinchum thereafter ordered the Emergency Response Team to stage at the Blacksburg Police Department, not the Virginia Tech Police Department. Upon information and belief, the Emergency Response Team, was staged at the Blacksburg Police Department out of concern that its staging on campus could adversely impact the university’s image as a safe place for students and faculty. In the alternative, Defendant Flinchum, was ordered or directed to stage the Emergency Response Team off campus by the Emergency Policy Group or some of its members, probably Defendants Steger, Hyatt, Hincker and Byers out of concern about the university’s image. By staging the Emergency Response Team off campus and by failing to invoke those portions of its mutual aid agreement under which additional law enforcement officers and agencies would respond to the campus to establish a police presence, the deterrent effect of an on campus police presence was lost.
#6: A simple, factually correct message that at 7:15 a.m. there had been a homicide in West Ambler Johnston Hall, a second student had been critically wounded and the gunman was still at large and was presumably armed and dangerous was rejected by the Emergency Policy Group on the urgings of its “image group.” The Emergency Policy Group was divided into roughly two camps, one camp, hereinafter called the “safety group”, was desirous of adhering to prior university policy of warning the faculty and student body about the risk of harm as soon as reasonably practical, and to do so by telling the truth, and a second group, hereinafter called the “image group” made up of the Defendants Steger, Hyatt, Hinckle and Byers, Ford and McNamee also called the control group who wanted to “manage the message” in the way least damaging to the university’s image as they saw that image.
#7: Those in the Emergency Policy Group “safety group” wanted the campus alerted and warned of the threat and proposed that the campus be advised that there had been a homicide in West Ambler Johnston Hall around 7:15 that morning, that another student had been critically wounded and was not expected to survive, that no gun had been found at the scene and the gunman was at large and presumably armed and dangerous. Upon information and belief, the “safety group” also recommended that further classes be cancelled pending resolution of this crisis.
#8: At or about 08:45 a.m., as a result of the negligence of certain officers in the VTPD, members of the Emergency Policy Group were erroneously alerted that there was a chance the double shooting might have been a domestic dispute in the nature of a lovers triangle. The image group was seduced by the ability to control the message of the university’s image if the incident was a domestic incident and the suspect, Karl Thornhill, Emily Hilscher’s boyfriend, was promptly apprehended and his hands or his apparel tested positive for gunpowder residue, the “image group” could then depict the 07:15 incident for what it thought it might be, a domestic incident, and declare it closed with the apprehension of the presumed killer.
#9: At 09:26 a.m., after Seung-Hui Cho had returned to campus, the Emergency Policy Group issued an alert which said: “A shooting incident occurred at West Ambler Johnston this morning. Police are on the scene and are investigating. The university community is urged to be cautious and are asked to contact Virginia Tech Police if you observe anything suspicious or with information on the case.” The alert did not constitute a warning. While it urged the university community to be cautious, about what should it be cautions - a shooting incident of undescribed nature, which made no mention of any injuries, let alone a double homicide? The alert made no mention that the gunman who had already killed two people was still at large, that he [or she, for that matter] might still be on campus, that he or she was presumably still armed and potentially dangerous, and that students, faculty and employees should take all precautions for their own safety and that classes and all extra-curricular activities were being cancelled until further notice. As an inadequate warning, it constituted no warning at all, and in a sense artificially reassured the students, faculty and employees that whatever occurred in West Ambler Johnston Hall that morning was of much lesser consequences and risks than the Morva incident and the two recent threatened bombings on the engineering campus. The language, content and lack of specificity of the alert clearly implied that there was no reason to take any specific action for one’s own safety.
#10: Before 09:00 a.m. Byers notified his administrative assistant to lock their doors. Mr. Byers was then meeting with the Emergency Policy Group in an office in the Burrus building on the same floor with his office that he had just directed be locked down. Upon information and belief at that time and place Burrus Hall, the administration office building, was locked down. Another member of the Emergency Policy Group, Kim O’Rourke, staff assistant to President Steger, had called her home and recommended that her child stay inside. The university’s veterinary school went into lockdown. Seung-Hui Cho’s route of travel back from the Blacksburg Post Office to Norris Hall where he shot and killed 30 people took him directly past Burrus Hall, whose occupants were safe because, armed with the knowledge of the risks involved, they had gone to lockdown. Passing by Burrus Hall, which he could not enter, Seung-Hui Cho arrived at Norris Hall, which was unprotected because neither the students nor faculty in Norris Hall had been warned that a gunman was loose, perhaps on campus.
I have downloaded the lawsuits and read the portions which I find interesting, those that claim VaTech and its officials of gross negligence. This is long but if these accusations are true, I don't know why others accepted the settlement. I can easily see how the officials at VaTech tried to "manage" the message. The simple fact is that there was an armed person on the loose, reguardless of if they thought it was the girls boyfriend or not, he was not in custody and could be anywhere. I also find it sickening that the upper admin had their building put on lock-down (and someone from the vet school was likely part of this emergency group and had that building put on lockdown. If there was no danger, why go into lockdown? If there was enough danger for a lockdown, then the entire school should have closed and went into lockdown). There is a part I didn't include. It talks about how in two weeks, VaTech was having a huge fundraising gala in an effort to raise over a billion dollars. While the people lay dead in the building, one of the organizers of the fundraiser actually sent an e-mail saying that while this incident will have ramifications, they could use it to help drive donations.
Here are the bullet points:
#1: On or about 08:00 a.m. on April 16, 2007, President Steger called for the convening of the university’s Emergency Policy Group. Why the 40 minute delay in doing so is unknown. (My text: The first two kids were shot around 0715, with notifications to many officials sent out shortly thereafter.)
#2: Ample time then remained in which to cancel 09:00 a.m. classes and all other classes until the gunman was captured or the campus otherwise cleared of this clear and present danger.
#3: At that time President Steger or his deputy, Executive Vice-President Hyatt had full authority to order and/or issue an alert and warning to the student body and university faculty of the events which had transpired at West Ambler Johnston Hall and warn that the gunman was still at large, presumably armed and dangerous, and might still be on campus, but elected not to do so.
#4: As the time for cancelling 09:00 a.m. classes was approaching neither the Virginia Tech Police Department nor the members of the Emergency Policy Group, including these named defendants, had any information of the killer’s identity or whereabouts.
#5: In anticipation that the killer was still on campus and posed a clear and present danger to the safety of students and faculty, Wendell Flinchum, the Chief of Police for the Virginia Tech Police Department, initially ordered the assembly of the Emergency Response Team (ERT, a/k/a SWAT) at 8:15 a.m. For reasons unrelated to the safety of students and faculty, Defendant Flinchum thereafter ordered the Emergency Response Team to stage at the Blacksburg Police Department, not the Virginia Tech Police Department. Upon information and belief, the Emergency Response Team, was staged at the Blacksburg Police Department out of concern that its staging on campus could adversely impact the university’s image as a safe place for students and faculty. In the alternative, Defendant Flinchum, was ordered or directed to stage the Emergency Response Team off campus by the Emergency Policy Group or some of its members, probably Defendants Steger, Hyatt, Hincker and Byers out of concern about the university’s image. By staging the Emergency Response Team off campus and by failing to invoke those portions of its mutual aid agreement under which additional law enforcement officers and agencies would respond to the campus to establish a police presence, the deterrent effect of an on campus police presence was lost.
#6: A simple, factually correct message that at 7:15 a.m. there had been a homicide in West Ambler Johnston Hall, a second student had been critically wounded and the gunman was still at large and was presumably armed and dangerous was rejected by the Emergency Policy Group on the urgings of its “image group.” The Emergency Policy Group was divided into roughly two camps, one camp, hereinafter called the “safety group”, was desirous of adhering to prior university policy of warning the faculty and student body about the risk of harm as soon as reasonably practical, and to do so by telling the truth, and a second group, hereinafter called the “image group” made up of the Defendants Steger, Hyatt, Hinckle and Byers, Ford and McNamee also called the control group who wanted to “manage the message” in the way least damaging to the university’s image as they saw that image.
#7: Those in the Emergency Policy Group “safety group” wanted the campus alerted and warned of the threat and proposed that the campus be advised that there had been a homicide in West Ambler Johnston Hall around 7:15 that morning, that another student had been critically wounded and was not expected to survive, that no gun had been found at the scene and the gunman was at large and presumably armed and dangerous. Upon information and belief, the “safety group” also recommended that further classes be cancelled pending resolution of this crisis.
#8: At or about 08:45 a.m., as a result of the negligence of certain officers in the VTPD, members of the Emergency Policy Group were erroneously alerted that there was a chance the double shooting might have been a domestic dispute in the nature of a lovers triangle. The image group was seduced by the ability to control the message of the university’s image if the incident was a domestic incident and the suspect, Karl Thornhill, Emily Hilscher’s boyfriend, was promptly apprehended and his hands or his apparel tested positive for gunpowder residue, the “image group” could then depict the 07:15 incident for what it thought it might be, a domestic incident, and declare it closed with the apprehension of the presumed killer.
#9: At 09:26 a.m., after Seung-Hui Cho had returned to campus, the Emergency Policy Group issued an alert which said: “A shooting incident occurred at West Ambler Johnston this morning. Police are on the scene and are investigating. The university community is urged to be cautious and are asked to contact Virginia Tech Police if you observe anything suspicious or with information on the case.” The alert did not constitute a warning. While it urged the university community to be cautious, about what should it be cautions - a shooting incident of undescribed nature, which made no mention of any injuries, let alone a double homicide? The alert made no mention that the gunman who had already killed two people was still at large, that he [or she, for that matter] might still be on campus, that he or she was presumably still armed and potentially dangerous, and that students, faculty and employees should take all precautions for their own safety and that classes and all extra-curricular activities were being cancelled until further notice. As an inadequate warning, it constituted no warning at all, and in a sense artificially reassured the students, faculty and employees that whatever occurred in West Ambler Johnston Hall that morning was of much lesser consequences and risks than the Morva incident and the two recent threatened bombings on the engineering campus. The language, content and lack of specificity of the alert clearly implied that there was no reason to take any specific action for one’s own safety.
#10: Before 09:00 a.m. Byers notified his administrative assistant to lock their doors. Mr. Byers was then meeting with the Emergency Policy Group in an office in the Burrus building on the same floor with his office that he had just directed be locked down. Upon information and belief at that time and place Burrus Hall, the administration office building, was locked down. Another member of the Emergency Policy Group, Kim O’Rourke, staff assistant to President Steger, had called her home and recommended that her child stay inside. The university’s veterinary school went into lockdown. Seung-Hui Cho’s route of travel back from the Blacksburg Post Office to Norris Hall where he shot and killed 30 people took him directly past Burrus Hall, whose occupants were safe because, armed with the knowledge of the risks involved, they had gone to lockdown. Passing by Burrus Hall, which he could not enter, Seung-Hui Cho arrived at Norris Hall, which was unprotected because neither the students nor faculty in Norris Hall had been warned that a gunman was loose, perhaps on campus.
... poor guy 
